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RIDE OF THE SECOND HORSEMAN, Robert L. O'Connell, The birth and death of war,
320pp. New York: Oxford University Press. $25. - 0 19 506460 7.
AFTER THE GUNS FALL SILENT, Shawn Roberts and Jody Williams, The enduring
legacy of landmines, 538pp. Washington, DC: Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation;
distributed in the UK by Oxfam. Paperback, £12.50. - 0 85598 337 X.
Robert L. O'Connell has written a book of speculative history about warfare; sometimes
brilliant, it lapses only occasionally into sustainable extravagance. It is best to deal with
the extravagance first.
Ride of the Second Horseman begins by noting that the basic genetic predicates of human
behaviour, and particularly those of human aggression, were formed in the 99 per cent of
human history spent as hunter-gatherers. Life in the neolithic band, O'Connell says,
emphasized personal independence, general equality among group members, including
women, consensus-based decision making achieved through open and protracted
discussion, and freedom of movement. Weapons possession would have been virtually
universal among males, but employed for hunting and not dominating the group . . . the
status of females would have been reinforced by their role as gatherers the steadiest
providers of the most calories.
This is, to say the least, an aggressive reach into the psychodynamics of prehistory. It is
less a statement of evidence than a revival of the Noble Savage or of Locke's hard but
fundamentally sound state of nature, updated to 1990s sensibilities. O'Connell is
particularly concerned to assert female equality in the neolithic, with female earth deities
contrasted against the later warmongering male sky gods. The basis for this conclusion
rather peculiarly rests, however, on the mechanistic premise that women's role as the
"steadiest providers" would underline equality, as though economic contribution itself
had ever closely correlated with women's political equality. But O'Connell has in mind
much, much more. Neolithic conditions, he suggests, genetically selected for these
behaviours in human beings, with the end result that it appears that we retain the souls of
hunter-gatherers, preferring a way of life that permits a measure of equality, freedom of
speech, freedom of movement, and even an absence of war . . . it is possible to see
documents like the Bill of Rights and the Declaration of the Rights of Man as virtual
hunter-gatherer manifestoes, reassertions of what was fundamental to human nature as it
had actually developed.

Indeed, O'Connell suggests in passing that even the (hotly debated) American
constitutional right to bear arms might express a neolithic genetic inheritance.
This is, of course, unfalsifiable, but also manifestly silly, and it hardly bears mentioning
that only an American would say such a things. Only an American could be so convinced
of the universality of his tribe's peculiar constitutional customs the written mania for
rights-disclosures to argue that they are written in our genetic code. John Gray, take note;
your scepticism about American liberalism amounts to an attack on human DNA.
And yet these excesses notwithstanding, this is a wonderfully original book on war, a
genuinely synthetic argument that weaves together ideas from a wide array of disciplines.
It deserves to be read and pondered. The argument as to the origins of war commences
with the observation that only one other earthly creature quite plainly engages in war, if
by that term is meant "preparation, a group orientation, governmental and military
organization, palpable economic and political goals, and a focus on lasting rather than
momentary results". That is the ant. Those species of ant engaging in warfare do so
entirely by genetic programming, a genetic adaptation, first, to certain ecological
conditions and, second, because of the logic of ants' haplodiploid reproduction, descent
from a common mother, which ensures that each warrior sister shares with every other
fully three-quarters of her genes. Under these conditions, "death in battle is a trivial
matter compared with the success of an army composed of genetic near replicates".
O'Connell does not, however, press this genetic argument with respect to human beings;
his is not a sociobiological account of human warfare. Indeed, sociobiology as he notes,
has difficulty accounting for warfare among human beings, precisely because we do not
reproduce by haplodiploidism. The brothers in arms for whom human warriors die in
battle in wars between states are not "genetic near duplicates", and the very palpable
question is why anyone, or more precisely, anyone's genes, would go to war for the sake
of any corporate entity larger than immediate family. Instead of sociobiology, Ride of the
Second Horseman acknowledges that human war (but, emphatically, not aggression or
weapons-use, which O'Connell regards as innate in human beings, and particularly
among males) is a cultural, not genetic, adaptation, and a rather late one at that. But if
ants are driven by natural selection into genetic patterns of warfare under certain
ecological circumstances, and if human beings engage in warfare as a cultural adaptation
under analogous ecological circumstances, then war itself, O'Connell powerfully argues,
should be seen as a response originally driven by ecology. Not essentially by genetics,
nor essentially by class, ideology, or religion, nor even essentially by material scarcity in
a general sense, but instead by the scarcities of specific natural environments and
ecologies.
This is a provocative insight, and the key question for human beings is, therefore, which
ones? Ride of the Second Horseman locates the first evidence for true warfare, as many
other accounts have done, in the creation of walled settlements; warfare began with the
ancient (and now nearly forgotten) split between nomads and the sedentary, between
pastoralists and agriculturalists. It was accelerated by the domestication of the horse,
which contemporary research puts much earlier in human history than previously

thought, and which gave the nomads a weapon of unprecedented power; predictably,
however, a defensive counter-measure arose in the form of circumvallation.
This account has not yet strayed far from the usual. But ultimately Ride of the Second
Horseman finds the take-off point of warfare to lie not in the conflict between nomad and
farmer, but between one settled community and another, communities that were,
however, effectively created by nomadic pressures. The original tension between nomad
and farmer served as the "ignition", in O'Connell's phrase, because circumvallation forced
the concentration of dwellings. Behind city walls, from which the irrigation-based,
hydraulic despotisms of the Near East arose, social pressures intensified, as did the
division of labour; these pressures were driven by the extreme roller-coaster nature of
intensified agriculture (prone to collapse and crop failure at any time), epidemic disease
and population growth. It was this endemic demographic problem, Ride of the Second
Horseman asserts, revealing the book's intensely Malthusian cast, that war and armies
traditionally addressed among the agricultural, not just maintaining social control but
acting as stabilizing agents. During periods of overpopulation armies could conquer new
lands or, at worst, self-destruct and no longer have to be fed. And when numbers fell,
new laborers could be appropriated, a process that serves to explain the traffic in slaves
and repeated transfers of entire peoples . . . . Soldiers were the medium of exchange, and
battles orchestrated to produce their death, capture, or return with more labour or land
were the key mechanisms by which energy was transferred from state to state.
Behind city walls, therefore, and forced there in the first place by predatory nomads,
large-scale society and large-scale warfare began, two sides of the same coin, and both
significantly patriarchal.
The argument is considerably more complex and subtle than this. It accounts, for
example, for the sharp differences in warfare in the New World as the result of the lack of
horses or even pastoral animals. This, O'Connell asserts, led to a lack of mounted
predatory nomads and less necessity for circumvallation; warfare thus took on a
considerably more religious and ritualistic form. Differences in warfare between New
World and Old are seen as reinforcing the thesis, not undercutting it. More important,
however, is that the whole tenor of the argument is determinedly ecological and
Malthusian. Yet Malthus was scarcely an optimist, whereas the fundamental point of
Ride of the Second Horseman is (perhaps rashly) optimistic: the decline and the fall of
large-scale warfare.
Given the ecological mechanics that O'Connell deploys to explain the rise of large-scale
warfare, it is easy to discern his account of its fall. Industrialization and development
removed war's ecological impetus, and moreover undermined its population-equilibrating
function. Food supplies became vastly more abundant, so reducing pressures on the
"supply" side. Simultaneously, on the "demand" side, populations grew to the point that,
in the modern period, only full-scale nuclear war could adjust population numbers to a
significant extent. So war no longer makes the kind of difference that, by O'Connell's
postulate, it did in earlier periods. Even the slaughter of the Great War, he points out,
"constituted but a small fraction of the combatants' populations, and was destined to have

only a marginal impact on future numbers. So war as a demographic lever had become
merely repellent."
Attractive as I find Ride of the Second Horseman's account of the rise of war, the account
of its demise is unconvincing. There is no reason, of course, why the two, origin and fall,
must be logically connected; it is possible that war indeed originated as a cultural
response to certain ecologies, but over time found other, purely cultural reinforcing
factors that have outlasted changes in those original ecologies. O'Connell would have
been forced to confront this problem, had he dealt with, rather than largely skipping over,
the rather significant history of war between the wars of the ancient world and the two
World Wars. His suggestion that totalitarianism, particularly in its Nazi imperial form,
revived an industrialized version of the ancient hydraulic empires (and for that very same
reason failed) is characteristically insightful, but in a glancing way; neither the two World
Wars nor, for that matter, the American Civil War can be explained on Malthusian
principles. Culture for its own sake, and not merely as an adaptation to ecological
circumstances, is, and has been for centuries, the driving force behind war. Class,
religion, ideology and corporate identity citizenship are not epiphenomenal to war, and
have not been for a very long time.
Ride of the Second Horseman is intended, in other words, to comfort us by explaining
that, yes, there is enough food in the world, and in any case war can no longer adjust the
population to meet food supplies I simplify the ecological argument greatly. But it fails to
comfort, because there are too many other reasons why war is a durable cultural practice.
O'Connell admits this in acknowledging the durability of civil war, which he treats as a
special problem none the less because, he says, its defining feature is the motivation of
"revenge" that lies beyond the premises of the original ecological argument, which was
about the gathering of resources without special regard for source; whereas combatants in
civil wars care deeply, if perversely, about the identity of their opponents. For that very
reason, however, it remains a self-limiting form of warfare; by its nature, it is limited to
specific populations and can never become generalized, no matter how brutal it is within
its operational sphere.
This is rather cold cheer in a world increasingly dominated by low-level civil wars. If the
only relevant point of comparison is full-scale, apocalyptic nuclear war, then, of course,
O'Connell is right, but in many respects it is hard to see nuclear war as "war" at all,
annihilation and war not necessarily being the same thing. Vastly more important to the
future of war, and vastly more pessimistic in its implications, is the spread of low-level
disorder in the world, fomented by, among other things, the spread of ever more powerful
but ever cheaper portable weapons systems. The future of warfare (and its miseries for
civilians) lies not in nuclear weapons, nor in "heavy" weapons systems at all, but in often
ignored so-called "light" weapons and "small" arms among others, the assault rifle, the
rocket-propelled grenade, the portable mortar, and the land-mine.
American and British peacekeeping forces in Bosnia recently suffered their first landmine casualties. They almost certainly will not be the last. These unfortunate incidents
may have one useful consequence, however, which is to alert both military

establishments and the public at large to the true nature of the risks posed by antipersonnel land-mines.
During the past three years, numerous prominent non-governmental organizations,
including the International Committee of the Red Cross and Human Rights Watch, have
conducted a campaign among governments and international agencies to make plain that
the some 100 million land-mines now in the ground and the some 200 million being
added yearly, mostly in low-level civil wars, are a disaster for the developing world that
is likely to get far worse before it gets better. After the Guns Fall Silent: The enduring
legacy of landmines is an institutional report produced by Shawn Roberts and Jody
Williams of the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, another important nongovernmental organization involved in the land-mines-ban campaign, which documents
the social, developmental and ecological consequences for civilians of the promiscuous
spread of anti-personnel land-mines. It is a superb and massive study, filled with raw data
gathered world-wide, and one that will be essential for those seeking to understand the
indirect effects of land-mines.
Because the peculiar fact about land-mines is that they currently kill perhaps 25,000
people a year unfortunate, yes, but fewer than annual US driving fatalities and not
remotely a global crisis. The crisis arises from the "ripple" effects of land-mines: when a
zone is infected with land-mines, it is as though the war has never ended from the
standpoint of the civilians, because land-mines go on killing and killing, and killing.
After the Guns Fall Silent documents in exhaustive detail how refugees cannot return,
agriculture cannot be resumed, productive activity cannot go forward in mined terrain.
And as a population of those injured by land-mines builds up within a fragile post-war
society, the effects on social and medical services are simply overwhelming; in these
societies, often subsistence-agricultural, there is nowhere to absorb those who cannot
work in the fields. Land-mines are a crisis in the developing world because of the
accumulation of these indirect economic and social effects. They are, importantly, in
many respects a weapon of mass destruction, but in slow motion; they devastate vast
areas of land as thoroughly and permanently as radiation, they take their toll principally
of civilians, and they are today used by combatants as much as a strategic weapon to
control terrain with a few troops and to disrupt patterns of civilian life in warfare between
insurgents and counter-insurgents as a tactical weapon to protect soldiers on specific
battlefields.
Nor is de-mining of mined areas by itself a solution to the crisis. The reason lies in the
economics: the average land-mine costs between three and twenty dollars, while the cost
of removal today is somewhere between $300 and $1,000 per mine. While economies of
scale and, possibly, improved sensor technology may bring down removal costs, the fact
remains that last year, for example, several million new mines were laid while perhaps
100,000 mines were removed at a cost of $70 million. No expert I am aware of believes
that there will be a technological "silver bullet" to make de-mining effective and cause
the mines problem to go away. If one understands the ravages that land-mines cause to
the developing world and the almost insuperable difficulties of de-mining, then the only
true feasible solution is a comprehensive ban on the weapon production, trade and use.

After the Guns Fall Silent is entirely persuasive: the only significant chance of improving
the situation lies in stigmatizing land-mines, imbuing them with the sense of horror that
chemical and biological weapons now invoke.
Perhaps this sounds quixotic, in the tradition of that traditionally quixotic endeavour
known as international law. Obviously anyone can make land-mines. But if the number
of suppliers were reduced significantly and if land-mine users were forced either to pay a
higher price for mines or to manufacture their own, the developing world would be
considerably better off. The nature of land-mine trade and use today is that they have
become a pure commodity cheap to buy and cheap to use. No commander in the field has
to think hard about the cost of land-mines, because they are so cheap. If, however, by
stigmatizing land-mines as outside the bounds of "civilized" warfare, international
commerce in mines were even partly interdicted, raising the ultimate price of mines to
end-users if mines became a premium weapon rather than a commodity available in
essentially unlimited quantities then something of value would have been achieved.
The future of warfare and the future of the control of war, if there is to be one, depend on
issues such as this. The academic and policy conversation about war and war-making,
weapons and aggression, needs to shift significantly from large-scale warfare and heavy
and strategic weapons to light weapons and small arms, man-portable systems used in
less than major conflicts that account for the worst of war's ravages today, and which will
do so for the foreseeable future. There is indeed an ecology of the small war, one in
which such weapons as mines figure heavily, and it is to these weapons and their
possibilities, their economies and ecologies that the considerable insight and intellectual
power of analysts like O'Connell should turn.

